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Bad Law or Just Bad Timing?: 
Post-pandemic Implications of Managed 
Care Advisory Group, LLC v. CIGNA 
Healthcare, Inc.’s Ban on the Use of 
Virtual Technology for Taking Non-party 
Evidence Under Section 7 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act 
LATOYA C. BROWN* 
The COVID-19 pandemic has had an enormous socio-
economic impact globally. To continue operations, the le-
gal field, like other sectors, has had to adapt to the exigen-
cies of the pandemic by, inter alia, becoming increasingly 
reliant on remote technologies to conduct business. Yet, on-
ly a few months before COVID-19 was declared a pandem-
ic, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in Managed Care Advisory 
Group, LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d 1145 
(11th Cir. 2019), that Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (the “FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 7, prohibits prehearing dis-
covery and does not allow a summonsed witness to appear 
 
 *  Latoya C. Brown is an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) for 
the Southern District of Florida. Prior to serving as an AUSA, Ms. Brown was a 
federal law clerk in the Southern District of Florida. Ms. Brown is a published 
author who, before her clerkship, practiced as a civil litigator, focusing primarily 
on complex litigation. The opinions expressed in this Article are not necessarily 
the views of the Department of Justice. Ms. Brown would like to thank her col-
leagues and research collaborators for their support and contribution to this pro-
ject. 
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in locations outside the physical presence of the arbitrator 
and, thus, an arbitral summons for a witness to appear via 
video conference is not enforceable. Intellectually, Man-
aged Care raises interesting issues concerning the textualist 
approach to statutory construction. For practical purposes, 
the opinion stands at odds with the realities of arbitration 
in the modern world, where remote technology has played 
a key role in the efficient administration of arbitration pro-
ceedings. Further, in light of the pandemic and its related 
health risks, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion raises concerns 
about the conduct of arbitration proceedings, particularly 
when disclosure of information by non-parties is needed for 
a full and fair hearing. After examining the text of Section 7 
and federal circuit courts’ opinions interpreting the provi-
sion, this Article proposes an alternate, perhaps timelier, 
textual interpretation of Section 7—one that remains true to 
the text, comports with the practicalities of modern arbitra-
tion, and anticipates challenges that will continue or arise 
in a post-pandemic world. 
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On September 18, 2019, six months before the World Health 
Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic,1 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Managed 
Care Advisory Group, LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc.2 During 
this time, legal communities were becoming increasingly reliant on 
remote technologies such as Zoom Video Communications, Inc.3 
In Managed Care, the Eleventh Circuit held, among other things, 
that the words “attend,” “attendance,” and “before” contained in 
Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), do “not au-
thorize district courts to compel witnesses to appear in locations 
 
 1 See Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General’s opening 
remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 11 March 2020 (Mar. 11, 2020) 
(transcript available at https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/ 
who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---
11-march-2020) (“We have therefore made the assessment that COVID-19 can 
be characterized as a pandemic.”). COVID-19 is caused by infection with a new 
coronavirus called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, or SARS-
CoV-2. Symptoms of COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html 
(last updated Feb. 22, 2021). Compared to the flu, COVID-19 seems to spread 
more easily and causes more serious illnesses in some people. Id. 
 2 Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d 
1145, 1151 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 3 Matt Torman, Zoom Court Is Now in Session: How the Legal World Has 
Pivoted to Virtual During COVID-19, ZOOM BLOG (July 23, 2020), 
https://blog.zoom.us/zoom-virtual-law-firm-virtual-courtroom-during-covid-19/. 
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outside the physical presence of the arbitrator, so the court may not 
enforce an arbitral summons for a witness to appear via video con-
ference.”4 The Eleventh Circuit reached its conclusion by applying 
a textual approach to statutory construction, for which it relied in 
part on “dictionaries” published around the time the FAA was en-
acted––in 1925.5 
With Managed Care, the Eleventh Circuit became the first, and 
thus far only, federal circuit to limit the use of video technology in 
connection with arbitrators’ power to summons non-party witness-
es and document production under Section 7 of the FAA.6 While 
other federal circuit courts had previously addressed and, by ma-
jority, limited pre-hearing discovery under Section 7 as it relates to 
nonparties to the arbitration proceedings,7 none had considered the 
role of remote technologies under Section 7. 
This Article begins by examining the text of Section 7 and how 
federal circuit courts’ opinions issued prior to Managed Care in-
terpreted the language used in that provision. The Article then con-
siders the specific holding of the Eleventh Circuit in Managed 
Care. Then, the Article proposes an alternative, perhaps timelier, 
textual approach to Section 7, and how that alternative approach 
comports with standards in the field of arbitration. Finally, the Ar-
ticle examines the implication of Managed Care for arbitrations 
conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic and in a post-pandemic 
environment. 
I. SECTION 7 OF THE FAA 
The FAA was enacted in 1925 and then reenacted and codified 
in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code.8 “It has not been 
amended since the enactment of Title VII in 1964.”9 The FAA was 
enacted “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been 
 
 4 Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1151. 
 5 Id. at 1160. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See discussion infra Part II. 
 8 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288 (2002). 
 9 Id. at 288–89. 
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adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements 
upon the same footing as other contracts.”10 Arbitration is a crea-
ture of contract.11 Thus, the arbitrator’s power over the parties to 
the arbitration proceedings is limited by the contours of the parties’ 
agreement.12 In like manner, the only power an arbitrator has over 
non-parties––who have not bargained to submit to arbitration––is 
the authority granted by the FAA.13 
Regarding arbitrators’ subpoena powers, Section 7 of the FAA 
provides: 
The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this 
title or otherwise, or a majority of them, may sum-
mon in writing any person to attend before them or 
any of them as a witness and in a proper case to 
bring with him or them any book, record, document, 
or paper which may be deemed material as evidence 
in the case . . . . [I]f any person or persons so sum-
moned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said 
summons, upon petition the United States district 
court for the district in which such arbitrators, or a 
majority of them, are sitting may compel the attend-
ance of such person or persons before said arbitra-
tor or arbitrators, or punish said person or persons 
for contempt in the same manner provided by law 
for securing the attendance of witnesses or their 
punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the 
courts of the United States.14 
This provision gives arbitrators two powers that are relevant here: 
“First, arbitrators may compel the attendance of a person ‘to attend 
 
 10 Id. at 289 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 
24 (1991)). 
 11 See Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 
F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 12 See id. 
 13 Kennedy v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 
1342, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 14 9 U.S.C. § 7 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
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before them . . . as a witness,’ and second, arbitrators may compel 
such person ‘to bring with him or them’ relevant documents.”15 
Since an arbitrator’s power over parties to an arbitration pro-
ceeding stems from the arbitration agreement, notwithstanding lim-
itations in Section 7, where the agreement so provides, the arbitra-
tor may more broadly compel discovery from the parties.16 Federal 
courts are split, however, on whether Section 7 authorizes arbitra-
tors to compel pre-hearing document discovery from entities or 
persons not parties to the arbitration proceeding.17 Some courts 
have concluded that Section 7 restricts an arbitrator’s subpoena 
power to situations in which the non-party has been called to ap-
pear in the “physical” presence of the arbitrator and to hand over 
the documents at that time.18 This Article proceeds to take a brief 
look at these decisions. 
II. FEDERAL CIRCUITS INTERPRETING SECTION 7 PRIOR TO 
MANAGED CARE 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Managed Care was issued 
against a backdrop of opinions by the Fourth,19 Sixth,20 Eighth,21 
Third,22 Second,23 and Ninth24 Circuits addressing the scope of 
arbitrators’ powers under Section 7 to compel a person “to attend 
before them . . . as a witness” and “to bring with him or them” rel-
evant documents.25 The outcome of Managed Care was at least 
 
 15 CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 16 Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 
210, 217 (2d Cir. 2008); see also CVS Health, 878 F.3d at 708. 
 17 See discussion infra Part II. 
 18 See Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 407 (3d 
Cir. 2004); Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 
F.3d 1145, 1160–61 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 19 COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 20 Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004, 
1004 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 21 In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 22 Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 405, 407. 
 23 Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 
210, 214 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 24 CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 25 Id. 
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partly shaped by this preexisting legal landscape.26 Therefore, it is 
important to take a brief look at the factual context of the federal 
circuits’ prior opinions and the reasoning behind those decisions. 
A. Fourth Circuit 
In COMSAT Corporation v. National Science Foundation, the 
Fourth Circuit decided an appeal brought by the National Science 
Foundation (the “NSF”) from an order requiring the agency to 
comply with subpoenas issued by an arbitrator during prehearing 
discovery.27 The subpoenas demanded that the agency, which was 
not a party to the arbitration agreement at issue, produce docu-
ments and employee testimony related to a construction contract 
between appellee, COMSAT, Inc., and an NSF awardee.28 The 
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held in-
stead that the FAA does not authorize an arbitrator to subpoena 
third parties during prehearing discovery, absent a showing of spe-
cial need or hardship.29 
The Fourth Circuit stated that “[b]y its own terms, the FAA’s 
subpoena authority is defined as the power of the arbitration panel 
to compel non-parties to appear ‘before them;’ that is, to compel 
testimony by non-parties at the arbitration hearing.”30 The FAA 
does not “grant an arbitrator the authority to order non-parties to 
appear at depositions, or the authority to demand that non-parties 
provide the litigating parties with documents during prehearing 
discovery.”31 The court also rejected the proposition that an arbi-
trator’s power was coextensive with that of a federal district court 
so as to allow “full-blown discovery.”32 The rationale for doing so, 
the court reasoned, is that “[p]arties to a private arbitration agree-
ment forego certain procedural rights attendant to formal litigation 
 
 26 See Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 
F.3d 1145, 1151 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 27 COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 271 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 28 Id.  
 29 Id. at 271, 278. The appellate court also analyzed the issues raised by the 
appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. 
 30 Id. at 275. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 276. 
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in return for a more efficient and cost-effective resolution of their 
disputes.”33 The Fourth Circuit stated, however, that “under unusu-
al circumstances,” and upon making the requisite showing, a party 
may “petition the district court to compel pre-arbitration discovery 
upon a showing of special need or hardship.”34 
B. Sixth Circuit 
A few months prior to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
COMSAT, the Sixth Circuit briefly addressed Section 7, in dicta, in 
American Federation of Television & Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV.35 
That case involved a labor dispute implicating section 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act.36 The appellant filed an action 
in federal court seeking to enforce a subpoena duces tecum issued 
by the arbitrator to a nonparty to the underlying arbitration.37 The 
Sixth Circuit ultimately agreed with the appellant that the district 
court had authority to enforce the arbitrator’s subpoena under sec-
tion 301 and looked to Section 7 of the FAA for guidance in reach-
ing its decision.38 
Specifically, examining Section 7, the Sixth Circuit noted that: 
Just as the subpoena power of an arbitrator under 
the FAA extends to non-parties, a labor arbitrator 
conducting an arbitration under a collective bargain-
ing agreement should also have the power to sub-
poena third parties. See Wilkes-Barre, 559 F. Supp. 
at 880 (“a decision to enforce an arbitrator’s sub-
poena will promote the goals of labor policy if it 
will foster the effective operation of arbitration ma-
chinery”). In addition, the FAA’s provision author-
izing an arbitrator to compel the production of doc-
uments from third parties for purposes of an arbitra-
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV 164 F.3d 1004, 
1004 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 36 Id. at 1006–07. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 1008–09. 
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tion hearing has been held to implicitly include the 
authority to compel the production of documents for 
inspection by a party prior to the hearing.39 
Accordingly, the court concluded that “a labor arbitrator is au-
thorized to issue a subpoena duces tecum to compel a third party to 
produce records he deems material to the case either before or at an 
arbitration hearing.”40 
C. Eighth Circuit 
In re Security Life Insurance Co. of America arose from an un-
derlying arbitration brought by a health insurer to determine its 
compliance with a reinsurance contract it had in place with 
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company (“Transameri-
ca”) and other insurers.41 The arbitration panel issued a subpoena 
to Transamerica “to produce documents and to provide the testi-
mony of a certain employee.”42 However, Transamerica “refused 
to respond to the subpoena, contending that it was not a party to 
the arbitration” and, thus, the arbitration panel had no authority to 
issue the subpoena under the FAA.43 The Eight Circuit disagreed.44 
While the Eight Circuit recognized that Section 7 does not “ex-
plicitly authorize the arbitration panel to require the production of 
documents for inspection by a party” and that “the efficient resolu-
tion of disputes through arbitration necessarily entails a limited 
discovery process,” it found that “efficiency is furthered by permit-
ting a party to review and digest relevant documentary evidence 
prior to the arbitration hearing.”45 Therefore, the court held that 
“implicit in an arbitration panel’s power to subpoena relevant doc-
uments for production at a hearing is the power to order the pro-
duction of relevant documents for review by a party prior to the 
 
 39 Id. at 1009. 
 40 Id. 
 41 In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 867 (2000). 
 42 Id. at 867–68. 
 43 Id. at 868. 
 44 Id. at 870–71. 
 45 Id. at 870. 
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hearing.”46 And the arbitration panel could exercise its power even 
if Transamerica was not a party to the arbitration.47 
Thus, the Eighth Circuit apparently took a policy approach, as 
opposed to a textual approach, to hold that Section 7 authorizes 
arbitrators to issue prehearing document-production subpoenas on 
non-parties.48 To date, it is the only circuit to reach this conclusion, 
short of the Sixth Circuit’s similar conclusion, in dicta, in Ameri-
can Federation.49 
D. Third Circuit 
In Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., an employer 
commenced an arbitration proceeding against its former employee, 
alleging that the employee violated a non-solicitation clause in his 
separation agreement.50 To obtain information for the arbitration, 
the employer served subpoenas for documents on the employee’s 
new employers, PwC and its division, E.B.S.51 PwC and E.B.S. 
objected to the subpoenas, leading the employer to move for en-
forcement in federal district court.52 Among other things, PwC and 
E.B.S. argued that the FAA “did not authorize the arbitration panel 
to issue subpoenas to non-parties for prehearing document produc-
tion.”53 
Accepting the view of the Eighth Circuit and other district 
courts, the district court held “that the FAA authorizes arbitration 
panels to issue subpoenas to non-parties for prehearing document 
production.”54 The district court found “that even under the view 
of the Fourth Circuit, which permits production only when there is 
 
 46 Id. at 870–71. 
 47 Id. at 871. 
 48 Id. at 870–71. 
 49 Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004, 
1009 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 50 Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 405 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 406. 
 54 Id. 
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a ‘special need,’ the panel’s subpoenas would be valid.”55 On ap-
peal, the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.56 
Then-Judge Alito, writing the opinion of the appellate court, 
began with certain principles of statutory construction, noting “that 
recourse to legislative history or underlying legislative intent is 
unnecessary when a statute’s text is clear and does not lead to an 
absurd result” and “a court’s policy preferences cannot override 
the clear meaning of a statute’s text.”57 Looking at the “unambigu-
ous” language of Section 7, the Third Circuit found that: 
[t]he power to require a non-party “to bring” items 
“with him” clearly applies only to situations in 
which the non-party accompanies the items to the 
arbitration proceeding, not to situations in which the 
items are simply sent or brought by a courier. In ad-
dition, the use of the word “and” makes it clear that 
a non-party may be compelled “to bring” items 
“with him” only when the non-party is summoned 
“to attend before [the arbitrator] as a witness.” 
Thus, Section 7’s language unambiguously restricts 
an arbitrator’s subpoena power to situations in 
which the non-party has been called to appear in the 
physical presence of the arbitrator and to hand over 
the documents at that time.58 
For support, and to show that the result of its analysis is not ab-
surd, the court pointed to similarities in the language used in Sec-
tion 7 of the FAA and in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 at the 
time it was adopted in 1937, which, as interpreted by courts, did 
not allow federal courts to issue prehearing document subpoenas 
on non-parties: 
[W]e believe that a reasonable argument can be 
made that a literal reading of Section 7 actually fur-
thers arbitration’s goal of “resolving disputes in a 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 407. 
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timely and cost efficient manner.” Painewebber Inc. 
v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1380 (3d Cir.1993). 
First, as noted above, until 1991 the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure themselves did not permit a fed-
eral court to compel pre-hearing document produc-
tion by non-parties. That the federal courts were left 
for decades to operate with this limitation of their 
subpoena power strongly suggests that the result 
produced by interpreting Section 7 of the FAA as 
embodying a similar limitation is not absurd.59 
Citing COMSAT, the second reason the Third Circuit provided 
for concluding “it is not absurd to read the FAA as circumscribing 
an arbitration panel’s power to affect those who did not agree to its 
jurisdiction”60 is: 
The requirement that document production be made 
at an actual hearing may, in the long run, discourage 
the issuance of large-scale subpoenas upon non-
parties. This is so because parties that consider ob-
taining such a subpoena will be forced to consider 
whether the documents are important enough to jus-
tify the time, money, and effort that the subpoena-
ing parties will be required to expend if an actual 
appearance before an arbitrator is needed. Under a 
system of pre-hearing document production, by 
contrast, there is less incentive to limit the scope of 
discovery and more incentive to engage in fishing 
expeditions that undermine some of the advantages 
of the supposedly shorter and cheaper system of ar-
bitration.61 
The Third Circuit expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit’s “spe-
cial needs” standard as a potential exception to its holding, and 
stated that it disagreed with the Eighth Circuit’s “power-by-
 
 59 Id. at 409. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. (citing COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 269, 276 
(4th Cir. 1999)). 
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implication analysis,” reasoning instead that “[i]f the FAA had 
been meant to confer . . . broader power, . . . the drafters would 
have said so . . . .”62 Finally, the Third Circuit noted that if it is 
desirable for arbitrators to possess the power to require non-parties 
to produce documents without also subpoenaing them to appear in 
person before the panel, the way to confer that power is by 
“amending Section 7 of the FAA, just as Rule 45 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in 1991 to confer such a 
power on district courts.”63 
E. Second Circuit 
In Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of Lon-
don, Life Settlements Corp. d/b/a Peachtree Life Settlements 
(“Peachtree”) purchased life insurance policies from elderly in-
sureds for its own account and for related entities, such as Life Re-
ceivables Trust (the “Trust”).64 Peachtree receives contractual fees 
from the Trust but it does not hold a financial interest in the 
Trust.65 Instead, the Trust “pays the premiums on the policy while 
the insured remains alive in order to keep the policies in force” 
and, “[u]pon the insured’s demise, the Trust is paid the ‘net death 
benefit’ on the policy.”66 “As a hedge against the possibility that 
the insured might live past his or her projected life expectancy, 
Peachtree buys contingent cost insurance (“CCI”) policies from 
Syndicate 102 for the benefit of the Trust.”67 Hence, “[i]f the in-
sured lives more than two years beyond his or her life expectancy, 
Syndicate 102 pays the Trust the net death benefit and assumes the 
policy itself.”68 
In one instance, Syndicate 102 refused to pay the Trust net 
death benefits on grounds that the Trust fraudulently misrepresent-
ed the date on which it acquired the policies at issue and had 
 
 62 Id. at 408. 
 63 Id. at 409. 
 64 Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 
210, 212 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
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fraudulently calculated the insured’s life expectancy.69 The agree-
ment between Peachtree, the Trust, and Syndicate 102 contained 
an arbitration clause.70 Pursuant to that clause, the Trust initiated 
arbitration against Syndicate 102, during which Syndicate 102 
submitted certain discovery requests from the Trust and Peachtree, 
a non-party to the arbitration.71 Subsequently, “the arbitration pan-
el issued a subpoena requiring Peachtree to produce responsive 
documents” and “Peachtree filed suit in federal court and moved to 
quash the subpoena.”72 The district court granted Syndicate 102’s 
motion to enforce the subpoena.73 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s deci-
sion and held that the documents had to be produced by a witness 
at a hearing before the arbitrators.74 The Second Circuit began by 
reiterating the established principle that the court’s only role when 
faced with clear statutory language is to enforce that language “ac-
cording to its terms.”75 Finding that the “language of section 7 is 
straightforward and unambiguous,” the appellate court interpreted 
that language to mean that “[d]ocuments are only discoverable in 
arbitration when brought before arbitrators by a testifying wit-
ness.”76 The court further explained: 
The FAA was enacted in a time when pre-hearing 
discovery in civil litigation was generally not per-
mitted. The fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were since enacted and subsequently broad-
ened demonstrates that if Congress wants to expand 
arbitral subpoena authority, it is fully capable of do-
ing so. There may be valid reasons to empower ar-
bitrators to subpoena documents from third parties, 
but we must interpret a statute as it might be, since 
“courts must presume that a legislature says in a 
 
 69 Id. at 213. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 214. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 218–19. 
 75 Id. at 216. 
 76 Id. 
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statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says . . . .” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. [sic] 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 
(1992). A statute’s clear language does not morph 
into something more just because courts think it 
makes sense for it to do so.77 
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit “join[ed] the 
Third Circuit in holding that Section 7 of the FAA does not author-
ize arbitrators to compel pre-hearing document discovery from 
entities not party to the arbitration proceedings.”78 
The Second Circuit noted that this outcome “does not leave ar-
bitrators powerless” as arbitrators had other tools available to 
compel discovery from non-parties.79 For instance, “where the 
non-party to the arbitration is a party to the arbitration agreement, 
there may be instances where formal joinder is appropriate, ena-
bling arbitrators to exercise their contractual jurisdiction over par-
ties before them.”80 Additionally, the arbitration panel or a single 
arbitrator could summon a non-party to give testimony and pro-
duce documents at a time separate and apart from the conduct of a 
final hearing.81 
As a practical matter, it has become commonplace in sophisti-
cated arbitration practice to designate a single member of a tribu-
nal, often the Chair, to travel to the location of non-party witnesses 
to summons them for the presentation of documents and testimo-
ny.82 This clunky process has permitted parties and arbitrators to 
obtain essential evidence for decades.83 
 
 77 Id. at 217. 
 78 Id. at 216–17. 
 79 Id. at 218. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Rules of Arbitration, INT’L TRADE CTR., https://www.intracen.org/
Rules-of-Arbitration/ (last visited May 15, 2021) (“The appointed arbitrator can 
require secretarial assistance from the Center, travel to the residence of the wit-
ness or any other place, and summon the witness to the Tribunal.”). 
 83 See Call Center Call Out, NPR (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/
transcripts/918195277 (referring to the benefits of private arbitration as opposed 
to the “clunky” judicial arbitration process). 
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F. Ninth Circuit 
In CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, an arbitration panel in an 
underlying arbitration had issued a subpoena against the appellee, 
who was not a party to the arbitration, directing the appellee to 
produce certain documents prior to an arbitration hearing.84 The 
appellee did not comply and, subsequently, the appellants attempt-
ed to enforce the subpoena in federal court.85 The district court 
held “that the FAA does not grant arbitrators the power to compel 
the production of documents from third parties outside of a hear-
ing.”86 After considering the text of the FAA, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.87The Ninth Circuit explained that: 
A plain reading of the text of section 7 reveals that 
an arbitrator’s power to compel the production of 
documents is limited to production at an arbitration 
hearing. The phrase “bring with them,” referring to 
documents or other information, is used in conjunc-
tion with language granting an arbitrator the power 
to “summon . . . any person to attend before them.” 
Under this framework, any document productions 
ordered against third parties can happen only “be-
fore” the arbitrator. The text of section 7 grants an 
arbitrator no freestanding power to order third par-
ties to produce documents other than in the context 
of a hearing.88 
The Ninth Circuit expressly noted the similar interpretation of 
Section 7 by the Third, Second, and Fourth Circuits.89 It rejected 
the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit based on the plain text of 
the statute and practical consideration––that is, the view taken by 
other circuits that “third parties did not agree to the arbitrator’s 
 
 84 CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 704–05 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
 85 Id. at 705. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 706–08. 
 88 Id. at 706 (citation omitted). 
 89 Id. at 707. 
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jurisdiction and this limit on document discovery tends to greatly 
lessen the production burden upon non-parties.”90 
Two years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in CVS Health, the 
Eleventh Circuit issued Managed Care.91 As explained below, the 
Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar, but even more limited, view of 
arbitrators’ subpoena power under Section 7, like that taken by the 
Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits.92 
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT EXAMINES SECTION 7 IN MANAGED 
CARE 
In Managed Care, medical providers filed class action lawsuits 
against managed care insurance companies, like CIGNA 
Healthcare, Inc. (“CIGNA”), alleging that insurers improperly pro-
cessed and rejected certain physicians’ claims for payment.93 
CIGNA settled with the class plaintiffs and the court approved that 
 
 90 Id. at 708 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91 Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d 
1145, 1150 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 92 The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have apparently not ad-
dressed the issue. However, district courts in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have 
adopted the majority position above. See Next Level Planning & Wealth Mgmt., 
LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 18-MC-65, 2019 WL 585672, at *4 (E.D. 
Wis. Feb. 13, 2019) (“The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has not 
addressed the question. But district courts within the circuit have agreed with the 
Second and Third Circuits.”) (compiling cases); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. 
N.V. v. TRC Acquisition, LLC, No. CIV.A. 14-1191, 2014 WL 3796395, at *3 
(E.D. La. July 29, 2014) (“This Court agrees with the Second, Third, and Fourth 
Circuits that Section 7 provides only for the issuance and enforcement of a sub-
poena duces tecum against non-parties who are compelled to testify as witnesses 
before the arbitrator, not for a subpoena seeking merely the production of docu-
ments by a non-party who is not summoned to testify as a witness before the 
arbitrator.”); Empire Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Penson Fin. Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A. 
3:09-CV-2155D, 2010 WL 742579, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2010) (“The court 
adopts the reasoning of the Third and Second Circuits and holds that § 7 of the 
FAA does not authorize arbitrators to compel production of documents from a 
non-party, unless they are doing so in connection with the non-party’s attend-
ance at an arbitration hearing. As the Third Circuit reasoned, the text of § 7 
mentions only orders to produce documents when brought with a witness to a 
hearing.”). 
 93 Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1150. 
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settlement agreement.94 “Following the settlement, Managed Care 
Advisory Group, LLC (‘MCAG’), acting on behalf of some class 
members, entered into an arbitration agreement with CIGNA in an 
attempt to resolve a dispute over a portion of the settlement 
funds.”95 “The Settlement Agreement did not provide for arbitra-
tion and MCAG was not a party to it.”96 The settlement administra-
tor and certain reviewers involved in the processing and admin-
istration of the settlement agreement (the “Third-Parties”) were not 
parties to the binding arbitration and the arbitration agreement was 
only between MCAG and CIGNA.97 
During the arbitration, the arbitrator issued summonses to the 
Third-Parties requiring them to participate in the arbitration hear-
ing by video and also required the summonsed parties to produce 
documents.98 The Third-Parties objected to the summonses, which 
led MCAG to file a motion in federal court seeking to enforce the 
arbitration summonses under Section 7.99 The district court granted 
MCAG’s motion and also noted that “[t]he Arbitrator shall be al-
lowed to arbitrate the claims in the manner he sees fit.”100 On ap-
peal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the “district court abused its 
discretion in enforcing the arbitral summonses because the court 
lacked power under Section 7 to order the witnesses to appear at 
the video conference and provide pre-hearing discovery.”101 
Addressing both of the arbitrator’s powers under Section 7, the 
Eleventh Circuit interpreted the “plain meaning” of Section 7 “as 
(1) requiring summonsed non-parties to appear in the physical 
presence of the arbitrator as opposed to a video conference or tele-
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 1152. 
 98 Id.at 1150–51. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 1153. 
 101 Id. at 1161. In addition to ruling on the propriety of prehearing discovery 
from non-parties to an arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit addressed issues of final-
ity of the district court’s order enforcing the arbitral summonses and the order 
enforcing the settlement agreement; jurisdiction, venue, and service; and the 
district court’s failure to enforce the settlement agreement and compel an ac-
counting. Id. at 1154–63. 
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conference; and (2) prohibiting pre-hearing discovery.”102 Interest-
ingly, none of the earlier circuit court decisions addressed whether 
arbitrators could compel a non-party to “attend”––either for pro-
duction of documents or oral testimony, or both––by telephone, 
video conference, or other communications technology.103 
Expressly agreeing with the position taken by the Second, 
Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit held that: 
[T]he plain language of the statute is unambiguous 
in requiring witnesses to appear before an arbitrator 
and bring any documents with them, thus prohibit-
ing pre-hearing discovery from non-parties. The 
FAA confers the power to compel a non-party to at-
tend an arbitration hearing and bring documents, but 
it is silent regarding the power to compel documents 
from non-parties without summoning the non-party 
to testify. See 9 U.S.C. § 7. Thus, the FAA implicit-
ly withholds the power to compel documents from 
non-parties without summoning the non-party to 
testify. And if Congress intended the arbitrators to 
have the broader power to compel documents from 
non-parties without summoning the non-party to 
testify, it could have said so. Accordingly, we con-
clude that 9 U.S.C. § 7 does not permit pre-hearing 
depositions and discovery from non-parties.104 
The Eleventh Circuit proceeded to parse this holding. First, it 
addressed the arbitrator’s power to compel attendance.105 Recall, 
Section 7 states that “arbitrators . . . may summon in writing any 
person to attend before them . . . as a witness.”106 To “ascertain the 
meaning of ‘attendance’ and ‘before’” at the time Congress enact-
ed the FAA in 1925, the Eleventh Circuit looked to “dictionaries” 
from that time.107 Accordingly, the court concluded that: 
 
 102 Id. at 1161. 
 103 See discussion supra Part II. 
 104 Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1159–60. 
 105 Id. at 1154. 
 106 9 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added). 
 107 Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160. 
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In 1925, “attendance” meant the “[a]ct of attend-
ing,” and “attend” meant “be present at.” See, e.g., 
H.W. Fowler & F.G. Fowler, The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Current English 52 (1926). Similarly, 
“before” meant “in [the] presence of.” Id. at 74. 
And “presence” meant “place where person is,” 
while “present” meant “[b]eing in the place in ques-
tion.” Id. at 650. Thus, Section 7 does not authorize 
district courts to compel witnesses to appear in loca-
tions outside the physical presence of the arbitrator, 
so the court may not enforce an arbitral summons 
for a witness to appear via video conference.108 
As applied to the facts of the case, the Eleventh Circuit found 
that the district court erred in enforcing the summonses when the 
arbitrator would have been located in Miami while the non-parties 
were in their respective states, and the hearing would have taken 
place via video conference.109 
Moving to the second power granted to arbitrators under Sec-
tion 7––an arbitrator’s power to compel a witness “to bring with 
him or them” relevant documents––the Eleventh Circuit heavily 
relied on the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Hay Group to conclude 
that prehearing discovery “is not authorized by the FAA.”110 A 
witness must appear in the physical presence of an arbitrator and 
bring documents at the time of the hearing.111 The Eleventh Circuit 
agreed with Hay Group that “[e]nforcing Section 7’s prohibition 
on pre-hearing discovery does not lead to an absurd result because 
it will force the parties to consider whether the documents are im-
portant enough to justify” resources “the subpoenaing parties will 
be required to expend if an actual appearance before an arbitrator 
is needed” and “will induce the arbitrator to weigh whether the 
production of the documents is necessary.”112 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 1161. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. (citing Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 409 
(3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The Eleventh Circuit has thus taken a strict textualist approach 
to Section 7, as the majority of other Circuits have done.113 This 
stands in contrast to the Eighth Circuit’s––and even the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s suggested––more policy-based approach to the issue.114 This 
Article does not criticize either approach. However, the Eleventh 
Circuit currently stands alone, even among the textualist courts, in 
prohibiting the use of video technology under Section 7.115 As dis-
cussed in the next Part, there is room for another textualist ap-
proach to the issue of video technology under Section 7. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE, PERHAPS TIMELIER, TEXTUAL APPROACH 
TO SECTION 7 
On its face, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Managed Care 
would appear to be a disciplined textual analysis; it consults a dic-
tionary, one published near the time the FAA was adopted, to aid 
the court in its interpretation of the language of Section 7.116 This 
approach to statutory construction places the Eleventh Circuit firm-
ly on the side of circuits that have embraced a textual approach to 
Section 7 and rejects the position of other circuits that have gone 
beyond the text of Section 7 to imply additional authority of arbi-
trators issuing summonses and courts asked to enforce those sum-
 
 113 See id. at 1160 (“Looking to dictionaries from the time of Section 7’s 
enactment makes clear that a court order compelling the ‘attendance’ of a wit-
ness ‘before’ the arbitrator meant compelling the witness to be in the physical 
presence of the arbitrator.”); CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 
706 (9th Cir. 2017) (grounding analysis on the plain text of Section 7); Life 
Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (same); Hay Grp., Inc., 360 F.3d at 406 (same); COMSAT Corp. v. 
Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d at 269, 275 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). 
 114 See In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2000); 
Am. Fed’n of Television and Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004, 1009 
(6th Cir. 1999). 
 115 See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160. Some other circuit courts have 
discussed arbitrators’ power to summon non-parties, but none addressed whether 
arbitrators could compel a non-party to attend via telephone or video conference. 
See CVS Health, 878 F.3d at 706; Life Receivables, 549 F.3d at 216–17; Hay 
Grp., 360 F.3d at 408; In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d at 870–71; 
COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d at 269, 275–76; Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1009. 
 116 See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160. 
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monses.117 Certainly, a textualist approach to interpreting the FAA 
is not new, nor is it free of controversy.118 In fact, it is the domi-
nant method employed by courts in the United States.119 In the 
words of Justice Elena Kagan, “we’re all textualists now . . . .”120 
For textualists, “[t]he only relevant congressional intent is the 
intent that a court can glean from the plain meaning of the statutory 
language.”121 Consequently, textualists do not advocate “judicial 
review of legislative history and other materials that are not con-
tained in a statute’s language . . . .”122 This supposedly guards 
against “judicial activism through the manipulation of legislative 
history and other extrinsic materials.”123 To this end, 
“[d]ictionaries and canons of statutory interpretation assist textual-
ist[s] in their efforts to garner a statute’s plain meaning.”124 
 
 117 Compare Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160 (embracing textual approach 
to Section 7 in its use of dictionary to interpret Section 7), CVS Health, 878 F.3d 
at 706 (reaching a conclusion after “[a] plain reading of the text of section 7” 
and “considering the text of the FAA”), Life Receivables, 549 F.3d at 216 (em-
phasizing court’s role to enforce statute’s language “according to its terms”), 
Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 406 (looking at “unambiguous” language of Section 7, 
which overrides “a court’s policy preferences”), and COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d 
at 275 (interpreting Section 7 “[b]y its own terms”), with In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. 
of Am., 228 F.3d at 870–71 (ruling with a policy approach rather than a textual 
approach), and Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1009 (taking a more policy-based ap-
proach in interpreting Section 7). 
 118 See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme 
Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 99, 157 (2006); Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: 
The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a 
Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 830 (2002). 
 119 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 2118, 2118 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 
(2014)). 
 120 Id. (quoting Justice Elena Kagan as saying: “I think we’re all textualists 
now in a way that just was not remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the 
bench.” (citation omitted)). 
 121 Pittman, supra note 118, at 802. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 802–03. Justice Scalia “support[ed] a ‘holistic textualism’ approach 
whereby a court should obtain the plain meaning of the relevant statutory provi-
sion by examining both similar language in other provisions of the same statute 
and similar language in other statutes.” Id. at 803. 
 124 Id. 
2021] BAD LAW OR JUST BAD TIMING? 1059 
 
In this Part, this Article will first examine how the U.S. Su-
preme Court has used a textualist approach to interpret language in 
Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA, reviewing two decisions that ana-
lyzed the impact of the Court’s subsequent expansion of the Com-
merce Clause, on the meaning of the terms used by Congress in 
1925—“involving commerce” in Section 2 and “engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce” in Section 1.125 The two decisions, 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. Inc. v. Dobson and Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams, served to expand the applicability of the FAA to 
nearly all employment agreements in the United States, effectively 
preempting state law governing such employment relations.126 
Then, the Article will propose an alternative interpretation of 
Section 7 based on a textual analysis.127 This alternate interpreta-
tion is particularly timely considering the limitations on in-person 
interactions following the COVID-19 pandemic.128 Finally, the 
Article will compare its proposed alternate textual interpretation of 
Section 7 to the framework of existing rules on virtual proceedings 
by arbitral bodies.129 
A. The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the FAA 
Perhaps no federal statute has undergone greater modification 
through decades of decisions by the Supreme Court than has the 
FAA.130 The Supreme Court has employed a textual analysis in 
some of the most consequential decisions regarding the FAA.131 
And no single Supreme Court decision interpreting the FAA 
arouses greater controversy than its 5-4 decision in Circuit City 
Stores, in which it held that the FAA applies and preempts state 
 
 125 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74 
(1995); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118 (2001). 
 126 See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272, 279; Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119. 
 127 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 128 See Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-
sick/prevention.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2021) (recommending at least six feet 
of distance between individuals and that persons avoid crowds and poorly venti-
lated indoor spaces). 
 129 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 130 See Moses, supra note 118, at 112–13. 
 131 Id. at 131. 
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law that seeks to prohibit or limit mandatory arbitration provisions 
in employment contracts.132 That decision, and the controversy it 
engendered, arises from differing applications of textual analysis to 
the scope of the FAA as expressed in Section 2133 and the scope of 
the exception to its scope as expressed in Section 1.134 
In Allied-Bruce, the Court interpreted Section 2’s “contract ev-
idencing a transaction involving commerce”135 phrase as imple-
menting Congress’s intent “to exercise [its] commerce power to 
the full.”136  In Circuit City, the Court, in a highly charged deci-
sion,137 interpreted Section 1’s “contracts of employment of sea-
men, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce”138 phrase as implementing Con-
gress’s intent to exempt from the FAA only employment contracts 
of “transportation workers.”139 The majority reached its conclusion 
by applying a textual analysis that relied on “the maxim ejusdem 
generis, the statutory canon that ‘[w]here general words follow 
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are 
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects 
enumerated by the preceding specific words.’”140 
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, Justice Souter criticized the majority’s application of 
the textualist approach and applied his own textual analysis to 
 
 132 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2001). 
 133 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74 
(1995). 
 134 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119. 
 135 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 136 See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277. 
 137 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that twenty-one attorneys 
general had joined an amicus opposing the preemption of state laws restricting 
or limiting the inclusion of arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Circuit 
City, 532 U.S. at 121. Sidestepping the argument, he simply pointed out that the 
argument was misdirected because it is relevant instead to the Court’s decision 
in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), holding that Congress intend-
ed the FAA to apply in state courts, and to pre-empt state antiarbitration laws to 
the contrary, and that Congress had not amended the FAA in response to the 
Southland decision. Id. at 122. 
 138 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 139 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119. 
 140 Id. at 114–15 (citations omitted). 
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reach a different outcome; that is, Justice Souter would have af-
firmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, particularly its interpreta-
tion of Section 1 of the FAA as excluding all “contracts of em-
ployment.”141 Justice Souter reasoned: 
In [Allied-Bruce,] . . . we decided that the elastic 
understanding of § 2 was the more sensible way to 
give effect to what Congress intended when it legis-
lated to cover contracts “involving commerce,” a 
phrase that we found an apt way of providing that 
coverage would extend to the outer constitutional 
limits under the Commerce Clause.142 
Justice Souter concluded that “a correspondingly evolutionary 
reading” of Section 1 should be applied.143 Thus, the dissenters in 
Circuit City took the position that Section 1 of the FAA should be 
given the same expansive interpretation previously applied by the 
Court in Allied-Bruce to Section 2.144 
The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and 
Thomas, disagreed.145 In the Court’s opinion, Justice Kennedy ex-
plained the impact of the maxim ejusdim generis as follows: 
Under this rule of construction the residual clause 
should be read to give effect to the terms “seamen” 
and “railroad employees,” and should itself be con-
trolled and defined by reference to the enumerated 
categories of workers which are recited just before 
it; the interpretation of the clause pressed by re-
spondent fails to produce these results.146 
Thus, the majority concluded that only employment agreements of 
seamen, railroad employees, and transportation workers engaged in 
interstate commerce were excluded from the scope of the FAA by 
 
 141 Id. at 136–37 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 142 Id. at 134. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See id. at 135. 
 145 Id. at 114 (majority opinion). 
 146 Id. at 115. 
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the exclusion language in Section 1.147 Only two members of the 
Circuit City court remain on the bench––Justice Thomas from the 
majority and Justice Breyer from the dissent.148 However, textual-
ism has become the dominant method of statutory interpretation by 
the Court.149 
The result of just these two Supreme Court decisions made the 
FAA preemptively applicable to all employment contracts, other 
than those involving maritime, railroad, and transportation workers 
engaged in interstate commerce.150 Similar decisions by the Court 
interpreting the FAA to apply to consumer and other contracts of 
adhesion have made millions of employment and consumer dis-
putes and countless commercial disputes involving an arbitration 
clause subject to the jurisdiction of the FAA.151 In all such cases, 
the authority of arbitrators to compel the production of evidence 
from non-parties is solely derived from Section 7 of the FAA, un-
less the parties have chosen alternative arbitration law.152 This 
 
 147 Id. at 109. 
 148 See Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 149 See Kavanaugh, supra note 119, at 2118. 
 150 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272–73 
(1995); Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119, 122. 
 151 These decisions expanding the applicability of the FAA include: AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (FAA preempts Califor-
nia state law rule that contracts barring class actions are unconscionable.); Pres-
ton v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) (FAA requires arbitration first even 
when state law provides for administrative dispute resolution); Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (arbitrators must first hear 
challenge to legality of contract); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 
681, 687 (1996) (courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements under state 
laws applicable only to arbitration provisions); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Leh-
man Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (punitive damages may be awarded by 
arbitrators); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1989) 
(Securities Exchange Act claims are arbitrable under the FAA); Perry v. Thom-
as, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (FAA pre-empts § 229 of California Labor Code); 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (FAA applicable to contracts 
under state law). 
 152 The provisions of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, enacted by twen-
ty-two states, permit more extensive arbitrator summonses, but courts have not 
yet addressed whether Section 7 of the FAA preempts such conflicting provi-
sions. Arbitration Act, Uniform Law Commission, https://www.
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means, following Managed Care, in the Eleventh Circuit, arbitra-
tors may not require non-parties to appear at hearings by video link 
or other technology if the arbitration is governed by the FAA.153 
There are meaningful consequences to this position––
consequences that could have been avoided had the Eleventh Cir-
cuit employed an alternative textual interpretation of Section 7.154 
This Article discusses one such alternative interpretation in the 
next Part.155 
B. Alternative Textual Interpretation of Section 7 
As then-Judge Alito said in Hay Group, “[i]n interpreting a 
statute, [courts] must, of course, begin with the text. ‘The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly explained that recourse to legislative history 
or underlying legislative intent is unnecessary when a statute’s text 
is clear and does not lead to an absurd result.’” 156 Consequently, 
this Part’s alternative interpretation of Section 7 starts with an 
analysis of the language of Section 7 (aided by hypothetical facts), 
followed by an analysis of whether the proposed interpretation 
would yield an absurd result. 
1. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 7’S TEXT 
To aid in the analysis of the language of Section 7, consider the 
following hypothetical: Assume an arbitrator, in a case adminis-
tered by the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”), is-
sued a summons to a non-party, John Doe, to provide testimony 
and bring documents responsive to a duces tecum request attached 
to the summons. Mr. Doe resides in Michigan. The arbitrator is a 
lawyer in Miami. The case was initiated by a Notice of Arbitration 
 
uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=a0ad71d6-
085f-4648-857a-e9e893ae2736 (last visited May 15, 2021); see Albert Bates, 
Non-Party Discovery in Commercial Arbitration: Legal Arbitration: Legal Hur-
dles and Practical Suggestions, 10 PENN. BAR ASS’N 9, 10 (2005); infra Part 
IV.C. 
 153 See infra Part V (discussing practical impact of Managed Care on arbitra-
tion proceedings conducted during and after the pandemic). 
 154 See discussion infra Part V. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 406 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citation omitted). 
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filed with the AAA. Also, assume that the summons was issued 
after May 15, 2020, and that the arbitrator ordered a final hearing 
in the case to be held by Zoom video conference commencing De-
cember 4, 2020, over Respondent’s objection. The summons re-
quests the non-party witness to make available electronic copies of 
any responsive documents he may have two weeks in advance of 
the hearing by delivering them to the arbitrator, but the summons 
assures him that if he does not want to produce them in advance, 
he may prepare electronic copies and have them available with him 
when he accepts the Zoom invitation issued by the arbitrator (or 
case manager) pursuant to the summons to present testimony dur-
ing the Zoom hearing. 
The summons requests the non-party witness to inform the ar-
bitrator and the parties’ counsel not later than June 15, 2020, 
whether the witness intends to comply with the summons. The Re-
spondent and the non-party witness both object to the summons on 
June 15, and the arbitrator rules it must be honored after hearing 
objections from Respondent and counsel who appears for the lim-
ited purpose of objecting to the summons. Respondent and the 
non-party witness file motions to quash in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida. With these hypo-
thetical facts, this Article now walks through the textual analysis. 
i. Consulting Dictionaries to Assist in Textual Analysis 
As the district court would do in the above hypothetical, the 
analysis begins with the text of Section 7 and the language of the 
summons. Recall, in pertinent part, Section 7 provides that arbitra-
tors “may summon in writing any person to attend before them or 
any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or 
them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed 
material as evidence in the case.”157 As the Eleventh Circuit did in 
Managed Care,158 the hypothetical district court would consult 
dictionaries from the time of FAA’s enactment to understand the 
language used by Congress in Section 7. 
 
 157 9 U.S.C. § 7. 
 158 See Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 
F.3d 1145, 1160 (11th Cir. 2019). 
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Assume for this hypothetical, however, that the district court 
utilizes more than a single dictionary. Therefore, in addition to the 
one used by the Eleventh Circuit––H.W. Fowler & F.G. Fowler, 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 52 (1926) (the 
“Concise Oxford”)159––this analysis also consults the Webster’s 
Home and Office Dictionary (1921) (“Webster’s”) and Collier’s 
New Dictionary of the English Language (1926) (“Collier’s”).160 
In both Webster’s and Collier’s, “attend” is defined as: “to wait 
upon; accompany or be present with; serve or look after in any ca-
pacity; be present at; accompany or follow; v.i. to pay heed or re-
gard to; listen; be in attendance upon.”161  
“Attendance” is defined as “the act of attending,” or “waiting 
on.”162 And “before” is defined as: “before (be-for’), prep, in front 
of; preceding in space, time, or rank; in presence or sight of; under 
jurisdiction of; rather than; earlier than: adv. in front; in advance; 
previously; formerly; already.”163 
Based on the Eleventh Circuit’s discussion in Managed Care, 
the Concise Oxford dictionary apparently does not include the ital-
icized options as possible definitions of the pertinent terms of Sec-
tion 7 being analyzed here.164 There are at least four dictionaries 
from the relevant time period that the author has considered; two 
have the above referenced definitions used by the Eleventh Circuit 
(the Concise Oxford and the Pocket Oxford Dictionary (the “Pock-
et Oxford”)) and two have alternative definitions (Webster’s and 
Collier’s) that could lead to a different meaning for Section 7. 
 
 159 See id. Similar to the Concise Oxford dictionary used by the Managed 
Care court, the Pocket Oxford Dictionary from 1924 (“Pocket Oxford”) defines 
“attend” as “turn or apply one’s mind” or “be present, be at or with, accompa-
ny.” F. G. FOWLER & H. W. FOWLER, THE POCKET OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
CURRENT ENGLISH 45 (1924). 
 160 NOAH WEBSTER, WEBSTER’S HOME, SCHOOL AND OFFICE DICTIONARY 
50, 64 (1921); P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY, COLLIER’S NEW DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 64, 93 (1926). 
 161 WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 50; COLLIER, supra note 160, at 64. 
 162 WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 50; COLLIER, supra note 160, at 64. 
 163 WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 64; COLLIER, supra note 160, at 93. 
 164 The 1921 edition of the Concise Oxford dictionary does not define “at-
tend,” “attendance,” and “before” to mean, by interpretation, “to pay heed or 
regard to . . . the jurisdiction of.” See FOWLER & FOWLER, supra note 159, at 52–
53, 74. 
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Consulting Webster’s or Collier’s, Section 7’s “to attend before 
them or any of them”165 phrase may be interpreted to mean “to pay 
heed or regard to . . . the jurisdiction of”166 the arbitrators, or any 
of them. It could also be interpreted to mean “to be in attendance 
upon . . . the presence or sight of” the arbitrators, or any of 
them.167 Alternatively, this language may be interpreted the way 
the Eleventh Circuit interpreted it in Managed Care, using the 
1926 edition of the Concise Oxford.168 
The analysis does not end here. Courts should be disciplined in 
their use of dictionaries. Thus, this Article proceeds to determine 
whether the analysis displays such discipline. 
ii. Employing “Best Practices” for Using Dictionaries 
Numerous authors have criticized the Supreme Court’s use of 
dictionaries in support of textual interpretation of statutes.169 In a 
2010 Duke Law Journal article, one author captured the issue well: 
Textualism demands adherence to an objective, 
original meaning of the text. Thus, it is no surprise 
that dictionaries are so appealing to textualists: dic-
tionaries present an aura of objective authority, and 
there are dictionaries from any time period relevant 
for legal analysis. But fidelity to textualist princi-
ples requires a disciplined approach to using dic-
tionaries because they are neither as objective nor as 
 
 165 Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d 
1145, 1160 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 166 WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 50, 64; COLLIER, supra note 160, at 64, 93 
(emphasis added). 
 167 Webster’s dictionary defines presence as “the state or quality of being 
present; quickness at expedients; society”; and defines “present” as “being in a 
certain place; at hand or in sight; at this time; not past or future; instant or im-
mediate . . . .” WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 391. 
 168 See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160. 
 169 See, e.g., James J. Brudney and Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The 
Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 502 (2013); John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: 
Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 
YALE L.J. 484, 487 (2014); Kevin Werbach, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and 
Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438–42 (1994). 
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authoritative as they seem. And their misuse can 
lead to exactly what textualists often bemoan: the 
personal preferences of judges creeping into their 
interpretations of statutes or the Constitution.170 
Many have suggested ways in which courts might do a better 
job of using dictionaries. For example, Professors Brudney and 
Baum have recommended the Supreme Court consider adopting a 
“three-step plan in order to foster a healthier approach to its dic-
tionary habit.”171 Stated simply, the three steps are to: (1) recog-
nize that it has a problem (e.g., that it is over-emphasizing the val-
ue of dictionaries and misusing them); (2) change its method of 
using dictionaries so it is more transparent; and (3) stop using dic-
tionaries as a barrier to larger contextual considerations.172 In an-
other instance, the Harvard Symposium has suggested that “[i]f the 
Court relies on a dictionary, it should make at least some prima 
facie argument about the relevance of that particular dictionary for 
interpretation of the statute or constitutional provision under con-
sideration.”173 
Building on the Harvard Symposium’s position, the author of 
the 2010 Duke Law Journal article developed, and proposed that 
courts adopt, a detailed framework of best practices for textualist 
use of dictionaries.174 The framework begins with the basic obser-
vation that a dictionary “is simply the window through which one 
seeks to find . . . meaning” and that “the end goal is finding the 
correct meaning within the lexicon––not the dictionary . . . .”175 
From there, it proposes courts: (1) use only contextual analysis, not 
the definition to verify a presumed definition; (2) establish only 
outer boundaries; (3) use contemporaneous research on word 
meaning; (4) justify the choice of dictionary and definition; (5) use 
multiple dictionaries; (6) acknowledge contrary definitions and 
dictionaries; (7) account for weaknesses in older dictionaries; and 
 
 170 Phillip A. Rubin, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in 
Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167, 206 (2010). 
 171 Brudney & Baum, supra note 169, at 579. 
 172 Id. at 579–80. 
 173 Werbach, supra note 169, at 1453. 
 174 Rubin, supra note 170, at 189. 
 175 Id. at 189. 
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(8) recognize the limitations.176 Regarding points five and six, Part 
IV.B.1.i. consulted multiple dictionaries and acknowledged the 
existence of contrary definitions.177 These parts of the framework 
are, therefore, already met. This Article briefly examines the other 
points. 
Using only contextual analysis means the court should attempt 
to place the meaning of the word into the context of its use and 
time.178 In 1925, telephones had recently become a tool of busi-
ness,179 television had not yet been invented,180 and the idea of an 
internet would have been considered in only the creative mind of 
Jules Verne.181 As can be seen from the Supreme Court’s analysis 
of Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA in Circuit City and Allied-Bruce, 
respectively, the scope of the U.S. Constitution’s Interstate Com-
merce Clause as a source of authority for Congress to legislate was 
significantly restricted but would later become less so.182 There-
fore, considering the text of Section 7 in the context of 1925 Amer-
ica and without resorting to legislative history, this paper con-
cludes that it is likely Congress was using the words “attend,” “at-
tendance,” and “before” in their physical sense. 
To the next point under the framework––establishing only out-
er boundaries–––the dictionary should not be used to limit or con-
strict the possible meanings listed in contemporary dictionaries, 
but rather to establish only the broadest reasonable meaning. 183 As 
applied here, this is where the hypothetical textual analysis departs 
from the majority of circuits that have interpreted Section 7 to re-
quire a live witness, physically delivering documents to an arbitra-
 
 176 Id. at 190–98. 
 177 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.i. 
 178 See id. at 190–91. 
 179 BELL TEL. SYS., THE MAGIC OF COMMUNICATION 41 (1953) (“1914, Feb. 
26 - Boston-Washington underground telephone cable placed in commercial 
service.”). 
 180 Mitchell Stephens, History of Television, GROLIER ENCYC., 
https://stephens.hosting.nyu.edu/History%20of%20Television%20page.html 
(last visited May 15, 2021). 
 181 See Jules Verne, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.
newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Jules_Verne (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 182 See supra Part IV.A. 
 183 Rubin, supra note 170, at 191. 
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tor.184 It also departs from the holding of Managed Care to the ex-
tent that case prohibits use of video technology.185 This Article 
concludes, instead, that physical presence is not a necessary com-
ponent in a clear and unambiguous meaning of “attend before” 
under the definitions derived from Webster’s or Collier’s. Rather, 
“attend before” and “to be in attendance before” more likely in-
voke a type of adjudicative186 presence before the arbitrators. 
Thus, to the extent a dictionary should only establish an outer 
boundary, this Article concludes that ignoring the possible mean-
ings available under Webster’s and Collier’s would not comply 
with the suggested “best practices” for using dictionaries. 
The next requirement under the framework is to justify the 
choice of dictionary and definition.187 Of course, it may be more 
appropriate to use the two British dictionaries (Concise Oxford and 
Pocket Oxford rather than the two American dictionaries (e.g., Col-
lier’s and Webster’s)) to determine the intent of Congress in 
1925,188 but this Article decides that the dictionaries published in 
 
 184 CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2017); 
Life Receivables v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216 (2d 
Cir. 2008); Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 407 (3d 
Cir. 2004); COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 185 See Managed Care Advisory Group v. Cigna Healthcare, 939 F.3d 1145, 
1161 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 186 Judge Alito interpreted Section 7 as requiring “physical presence.” Hay 
Grp., 360 F.3d at 407; see infra Part IV.B.1.ii. But see Int’l Com. Disp. Commit-
tee Arb. Committee N.Y. City B. Ass’n, A Model Federal Arbitration Summons 
to Testify and Present Documentary Evidence at an Arbitration Hearing, 26 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 157, 170 (2015) [hereinafter NYCB White Paper] (“[W]e 
believe FAA Section 7 is reasonably read not to impose any requirement that the 
arbitrator appear in the physical presence of the witness––that adjudicative pres-
ence of the arbitrator (to rule on objections and declare evidence admitted) is the 
touchstone of Section 7 according to the interpretation given in the Life Receiv-
ables and Hay Group decisions . . . .”).  
 187 Rubin, supra note 170, at 192. 
 188 See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Be-
come a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 
BUFF. L. REV. 227, 238 (1999) (“Called the ‘most masterly and ambitious philo-
logical exercise ever undertaken,’ the first edition of the Oxford English Dic-
tionary was completed in 1933 and contained more than 400,000 entries sup-
ported by nearly two million citations.”). 
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America more likely provide a better window or proxy for the lex-
icon of the United States in the early twentieth century. As noted in 
the Publishers’ Preface to the 1926 edition of Collier’s: 
The Vocabulary, carefully chosen, is not only more 
comprehensive than that of any other dictionary of 
equal size, but it is also more modern. It is thor-
oughly up-to-date, and meets all the wants of the 
general reader of the present day. The words 
brought into our language by the World War, the 
new technical terms that mark recent advances in 
science, and the words that great political changes 
in nations have made a feature of modern speech 
are here collected and defined—a boon to the stu-
dent of current world progress.189 
This Article concludes, therefore, that Webster’s and Collier’s 
are appropriate for interpreting Section 7. 
To the final point in the framework––accounting for weakness-
es in older dictionaries190––notwithstanding Collier’s glowing 
prefatory note quoted above, the creation of dictionaries in the ear-
ly twentieth century was a laborious and imprecise process.191 Still, 
the fact that Collier’s and Webster’s include definitions provided 
in the Oxford dictionary and add additional possible definitions, 
particularly the possible use of “before” to include the concept of 
“jurisdiction,” is a reasonable indication that Collier’s Preface was 
not merely marketing. Rather, it is likely that this additional use of 
the word “before” had recently become a part of the American lex-
icon and is a reliable indication of its value. 
Having gone through the suggested “best practices” for using 
dictionaries, this Article concludes that Congress’s language in 
Section 7 is sufficiently broad to permit use of technology that did 
not exist and that would not possibly have been contemplated 
when the statute was drafted and adopted in 1925. The analysis 
here is similar to the textual interpretation employed by the Su-
 
 189 COLLIER, supra note 160, at iii. 
 190 Rubin, supra note 170, at 196. 
 191 Id. at 178–82. 
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preme Court in Allied-Bruce, where it concluded that by using the 
phrase “involving commerce,” Congress intended to extend to the 
outer limits under the Commerce Clause.192 Here, based on the 
textual analysis of the language in Section 7, it seems more likely 
that Congress intended for arbitrators to have the authority to issue 
summonses compelling non-party witnesses to be in attendance 
under the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to provide oral and docu-
mentary evidence relevant to the proceeding. While this certainly 
includes the authority to compel attendance in the physical pres-
ence of the arbitrator, that is not the outer boundary of Congress’s 
intent. Rather, it also includes the intent that as “new technical 
terms that mark recent advances in science” were added to Colli-
er’s,193 the power of arbitrators should include the authority to 
compel a witness to “attend” in the presence of the arbitrators 
through telephone, and later video or other future technology, and 
to bring with him electronic versions of responsive documents that 
are provided to the arbitrators in the first instance to “pay heed or 
regard to” their “jurisdiction[al]” authority. 
2. DOES THE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7 
PRODUCE AN ABSURD RESULT? 
It would be difficult to find a lawyer today serving as counsel 
in domestic arbitration proceedings who has not requested an arbi-
trator or tribunal to summons a person to appear before the arbitra-
tor of the tribunal by Zoom or other video conference technology 
and to have with him responsive documents, which through scan-
ning or other similar technology, may be made available to the tri-
bunal at the same time as the witness appears. It has probably hap-
pened hundreds of times each day since pandemic restrictions 
forced arbitral tribunals to conduct their proceedings by video con-
ference technology.194 Moreover, it is not only since the pandemic 
 
 192 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74 
(1995); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001) 
(“We had occasion in Allied–Bruce . . . , 115 S.Ct. 834, to consider the signifi-
cance of Congress’ use of the words ‘involving commerce.’”). 
 193 COLLIER, supra note 160, at iii. 
 194 See Al Tamimi, Use of Modern Technology in Arbitration: Evolution 
Through Necessity (July 31, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/
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that lawyers and others involved in arbitration have embraced an 
interpretation of Section 7 like the one reached by the analysis in 
this Article.195 
In fact, following the 2013 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 45 to provide for nationwide service of subpoenas, the 
International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Arbitration 
Committee of the New York City Bar Association developed an 
annotated “Model Federal Arbitration Summons to Testify and 
Present Documentary Evidence at an Arbitration Hearing” (the 
“NYCB White Paper”).196 The NYCB White Paper was designed 
to bring “together in one resource guidance on law and practice in 
regard to the issuance by arbitrators of compulsory process for evi-
dence to be obtained from non-party witnesses.”197 The annota-
tions provide guidance to counsel and tribunals to effectively ob-
tain documentary evidence from non-parties in light of the split 
among the federal circuits and between the Second Circuit and 
New York state courts with respect to pre-hearing discovery from 
non-parties in arbitration.198 In 2015, when the NYCB White Paper 
was completed, regarding the place of the hearing, the authors 
opined: 
Hearing witnesses by video link. . . . Section 7’s ob-
jectives (as considered by some courts) of requiring 
a hearing are achieved, even though the witness and 
the arbitrators come together by electronic means. 
Electronic presence of the arbitrator is an adequate 
substitute for physical presence, because the arbitra-
tor could lawfully attend in person.199 
 
detail.aspx?g=8869fc87-e787-419c-ab6a-23e33905a366 (explaining how inter-
national arbitration practitioners had to rely on technological means to resolve 
disputes given the restrictions of COVID-19 pandemic). 
 195 See supra Part IV.B.1. (concluding that text of Section 7 permits use of 
remote technology). 
 196 NYCB White Paper, supra note 186. 
 197 Id. at 158. 
 198 See id. at 161–71. 
 199 Id. at 170 (emphasis in original). 
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Notwithstanding this position on hearing by video link, the 
NYCB White Paper cautioned counsel and arbitrators to attempt to 
provide in the subpoena that the arbitrators will attend in person: 
While we believe FAA Section 7 is reasonably read 
not to impose any requirement that the arbitrator 
appear in the physical presence of the witness––that 
adjudicative presence of the arbitrator (to rule on 
objections and declare evidence admitted) is the 
touchstone of Section 7 according to the interpreta-
tion given in the Life Receivables and Hay Group 
decisions––it is prudent to avoid controversy on this 
point by providing in the subpoena that the arbitra-
tors will attend in person unless otherwise agreed. 
However, if a subpoena does call for video-linked 
hearing, enforceability of the subpoena might be 
supported by reference to FRCP 43, which express-
es the judicial preference for testimony in open 
court but provides that “for good cause in compel-
ling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, 
the court may permit testimony in open court by 
contemporaneous transmission from a different lo-
cation.”200 
Whether one agrees with the NYCB White Paper’s interpreta-
tion of Judge Alito’s decision, when the Third Circuit entered its 
decision in Hay Group in 2004, use of video technology to conduct 
arbitral proceedings and court proceedings was in its infancy, later 
to be thrown into young adulthood by the pandemic in 2020.201 
The narrow issue before the Third Circuit was whether pre-hearing 
production of documents without requiring a witness was permis-
sible under Section 7.202 As discussed in Part II above, the Hay 
Group court held that “documents only” compulsory production 
 
 200 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 201 See The History of Videoconferencing, BUS. MATTERS (Jan. 8, 2015), 
https://bmmagazine.co.uk/tech/history-video-conferencing/ (noting that Skype 
only first became available in 2003). 
 202 See Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 406 (3d 
Cir. 2004). 
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and compulsory pre-hearing testimony, with or without documents, 
were not permissible under the clear and unambiguous language of 
Section 7.203 The Third Circuit concluded that its interpretation of 
Section 7 did not produce an absurd result based on similar lan-
guage used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 at the time it was 
adopted in 1937 and practical considerations of how broader dis-
covery powers under Section 7 could undermine arbitration’s goal 
of being a “shorter and cheaper system.”204 There is no suggestion, 
however, in the majority opinion or the concurring opinion by 
Judge Chertoff that the possible use of video technology under 
Section 7 was even considered. 
Apparently, also considering whether the result was absurd, 
Judge Chertoff noted in his concurrence: 
Under section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act, arbi-
trators have the power to compel a third-party wit-
ness to appear with documents before a single arbi-
trator, who can then adjourn the proceedings. . . . To 
be sure, this procedure requires the arbitrators to 
decide that they are prepared to suffer some incon-
venience of their own in order to mandate what is, 
in reality, an advance production of documents. But 
that is not necessarily a bad thing, since it will in-
duce the arbitrators and parties to weigh whether 
advance production is really needed. And the avail-
ability of this procedure within the existing statuto-
ry language should satisfy the desire that there be 
some mechanism “to compel pre-arbitration discov-
ery upon a showing of special need or hardship.”205 
One wonders whether Judge Alito or Judge Chertoff would have 
reached the same conclusion about the absurdity of requiring 
“physical presence” when neither word appears in the language of 
Section 7 if they had been focused on video technology as an ade-
quate substitute for “physical presence” at a hearing before the ar-
 
 203 See supra notes 50–62 and accompanying text. 
 204 Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 409; see supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 205 Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 413–14 (citing COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. 
Found., 190 F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999)) (Chertoff, J., concurring). 
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bitrators and within the meaning of Section’s 7 to “attend before” 
phrase.206 
However differently the Third Circuit might have performed its 
textual analysis had the summons called for the documents to be 
produced by a witness by means of a video link at the time of a 
hearing that included the arbitrators, in the post-pandemic world, 
this Article’s alternative textual interpretation of Section 7 is a 
proper result of consulting contemporaneous dictionaries and it 
does not produce an absurd result. To the contrary, it produces a 
result entirely consistent with the normal practices in arbitration 
that both preceded and succeeded the pandemic without altering 
the outcome of the Hay Group decision, other than to link the 
presence of the arbitrators to the witness and the production by 
means of new technology. 
C. The Alternative Textual Interpretation Comports with 
Existing Standards in the Field of Arbitration 
Finding that Section 7 of the FAA requires adjudicative as op-
posed to physical presence not only passes the absurdity test, but it 
is also a result that reflects the practicalities of arbitration in the 
modern world.207 Even before COVID-19, parties and arbitration 
institutions have employed virtual technology to streamline and 
add efficiencies to the arbitration process, all while aiming to pre-
serve arbitration’s purpose of being an expeditious process.208 
 
 206 See Gaela R. Normile, Virtually Impossible: Eleventh Circuit’s Denial of 
Non-Parties Attending Arbitration Hearings via Video or Telephone, 
MARTINDALE (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.martindale.com/legal-
news/article_vandeventer-black-llp_2534575.htm (“Although it was not a possi-
bility to virtually appear at an arbitration hearing in 1925, such a strict interpre-
tation of Section 7 of the FAA may unnecessarily burden arbitration.”). 
 207 See Kateryna Honcharenko & Mercy McBrayer, Guidance Note on Re-
mote Dispute Resolution Proceedings, CHARTERED INST. ARB., 
https://www.ciarb.org/media/9013/remote-hearings-guidance-note_final_ 
140420.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021) (noting the need for virtual proceeding 
as “travel bans and severe government restrictions become more widespread”). 
 208 See Virtual Hearings, AAA-ICDR, https://go.adr.org/covid-19-virtual-
hearings.htmlhttps://go.adr.org/covid-19-virtual-hearings.html (last visited May 
15, 2021) (stressing that “[v]irtual hearings are not a new concept” and have 
been an “option to parties for years”). 
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Likewise, rules and guidelines have been in place to facilitate pre-
hearing discovery, including for non-parties to the arbitration pro-
ceedings.209 
1. THE REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT 
To illustrate, “to make the [arbitration] proceedings fair, expe-
ditious, and cost effective,” at the request of a party or witness, 
Section 17 of the revised Uniform Arbitration Act (the “RUAA”) 
authorizes an arbitrator to “permit a deposition of any witness to be 
taken for use as evidence at the hearing, including a witness who 
cannot be subpoenaed for or is unable to attend a hearing.”210 This 
provision covers non-parties to the arbitration proceedings.211 Still, 
the RUAA was mindful of preserving “the main advantages of ar-
bitration in terms of cost, speed and efficiency” and “safe-
guard[ing] the rights of third parties,” while also “insuring that 
there is sufficient disclosure of information to provide for a full 
and fair hearing.”212 Thus, as it relates to non-parties to the arbitra-
tion, the RUAA anticipates that the arbitrator will take “the inter-
ests of such ‘affected persons’ into account in determining whether 
and to what extent discovery is appropriate.”213 
Historically, the UAA, which is drafted by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is modeled on 
the FAA.214 Due to “the increasing use of arbitration, the greater 
complexity of many disputes resolved by arbitration, and the de-
velopments of the law in th[e] area,”215 many issues have arisen in 
modern arbitration that were not present in 1955, when the UAA 
was adopted.216 The RUAA examines these issues and aims to 
 
 209 See Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 407 n.1 (noting that many states have adopted 
statutes that “explicitly grant arbitrators the power to issue pre-hearing docu-
ment production subpoenas on third parties”). 
 210 UNIF. ARB. ACT § 17(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. STATE L. 
2000). 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at § 17 cmt. 2, 8. 
 213 Id. at § 17 cmt. 5. 
 214 See id. at prefatory note. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See JOHN COOLEY, THE ARBITRATORS HANDBOOK: REVISED 435 (2009) 
(“This growth in arbitration caused the Conference to appoint a Drafting Com-
 
2021] BAD LAW OR JUST BAD TIMING? 1077 
 
provide “state legislatures with a more up-to-date statute to resolve 
disputes through arbitration.”217 The RUAA has been adopted by 
twenty-one states including D.C., and was introduced in two other 
states in 2020.218 
In the summer of 2000, when the RUAA was enacted, the 
Fourth Circuit had already issued COMSAT, which limited the ar-
bitrator’s power to issue subpoenas to non-parties to produce mate-
rials prior to the arbitration hearing.219 This holding contradicted 
three federal district court opinions that had enforced arbitral sub-
poenas for prehearing discovery.220 The language stated, 
“[b]ecause of the unclear case law, Section 17(d) specifically states 
that arbitrators have subpoena authority for discovery matters un-
der the RUAA.”221 
While COMSAT was issued before the RUAA was approved, 
other circuits had not directly addressed Section 7.222 Since then, as 
discussed above, a majority position has emerged among the cir-
cuits interpreting Section 7 as requiring a non-party’s “physical” 
presence before the arbitrator or precluding pre-hearing discov-
ery.223 
2. ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS 
Notwithstanding the majority of circuits implying a “physical 
presence” into the language of Section 7, arbitration institutions 
have long permitted the use, and seen the value, of virtual technol-
 
mittee to consider revising the Act in light of the increasing use of arbitration, 
the greater complexity in many disputes resolved in arbitration and the devel-
opment of the law in this area.”). 
 217 UNIF. ARB. ACT. pmbl. 
 218 2000 Arbitration Act – Enactment Map, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey= 
a0ad71d6-085f-4648-857a-e9e893ae2736 (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 219 See supra Part II.A. 
 220 See UNIF. ARB. ACT § 17 cmt. 6; Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Delaware 
County, 879 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Meadows Indemnity Co. v. Nutmeg 
Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & 
Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
 221 See UNIF. ARB. ACT § 17 cmt. 6. 
 222 See discussion supra Part II. 
 223 See supra Parts II & III (discussing opinions issued by Fourth, Third, 
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
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ogies in arbitration proceedings.224 And, with the increasing use of 
remote technologies during the COVID-19 pandemic, some institu-
tions have provided additional guidelines.225 FINRA, for example, 
has noted how “COVID 19 has increased the demand for virtual 
arbitration and mediation hearings to ensure that cases can proceed 
without lengthy delays.”226 Consequently, FINRA issued a Re-
source Guide to help arbitrators conduct effective virtual arbitra-
tion hearings via the Zoom platform.227 The guide encourages arbi-
trators to be mindful of issues of fairness and impartiality by, inter 
alia, allowing parties to present evidence and testimony, including 
direct and cross-examination of witnesses, and to postpone the vir-
tual hearing until further notice if the arbitration panel believes the 
virtual hearing will result in unfairness to any party.228 
The American Arbitration Association International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution has provided similar guidance with its Virtual 
Hearing Guide for Arbitrators and Parties, Model Order and Pro-
cedures for a Virtual Hearing via Videoconference (“Model Or-
der”), and Virtual Hearing Guide for Arbitrators and Parties Utiliz-
ing Zoom.229 Interestingly, the Model Order allows for the parties, 
by agreement or order of the arbitrator (if no agreement by the par-
ties), to deem the hearing as having taken place “in the locale of 
the arbitration.”230 It also adds language addressing any objections 
 
 224  Id.; Virtual Hearings, supra note 208 (stressing that “[v]irtual hearings 
are not a new concept” and have been an “option to parties for years”). 
 225 See Tamimi, supra note 194 (“In the face of the ever-increasing re-
strictions on the movement of people and institutional shutdowns in Spring 
2020, arbitration practitioners demonstrated the resilience and flexibility of in-
ternational arbitration by continuing to resolve disputes remotely with the assis-
tance of various technological means.”). 
 226 Arbitrator Resource Guide for Virtual Hearings, FINRA, 
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/case-guidance-resources/arbitrator-
resource-guide-virtual-hearings (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 227 Id. (“FINRA Dispute Resolution Services is providing the Resource 
Guide to help arbitrators conduct effective virtual arbitration hearings via the 
Zoom platform.”). 
 228 Id. 
 229 Virtual Hearings, supra note 208. 
 230 AA-ICDR Model Order and Procedures for a Virtual Hearing via Vide-
oconference, AM. ARB. ASS’N 1, 1 [hereinafter AA-ICDR Model Order], 
https://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/AAA270_AAA-ICDR%20Model%
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to the virtual forum by noting the exigencies of the pandemic and 
that “videoconference is a reasonable alternative to an in-person 
hearing.”231 There is also guidance on witnesses appearing and 
presenting evidence virtually.232 
 
20Order%20and%20Procedures%20for%20a%20Virtual%20Hearing%20via%2
0Videoconference.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021). The Model Order states: 
1a. Agreement to Videoconference: [if it’s been agreed to] 
A. The parties and the panel/arbitrator agree that the hear-
ing in this case will be conducted via [Platform Name] 
videoconference. This confirms that the hearing will be 
deemed to have taken place in [locale/place of arbitra-
tion]. 
B. The parties acknowledge that they have made their 
own investigation as to the suitability and adequacy of 
[Platform Name] for its proposed use for the video con-
ferenced hearing and of any risks of using [Platform 
Name], including any risks regarding its security, privacy 
or confidentiality, and they agree to use [Platform Name] 
for the hearing. 
[or] 
1b. Order for Videoconference Hearing: [if ordered by the ar-
bitrator/panel and not agreed to by all parties] 
A. The arbitrator/panel hereby orders that the hearing in 
this case be conducted via [Platform Name] 
videoconference in accordance with the procedures set 
forth below. This confirms that the hearing will be 
deemed to have taken place in [locale/place of arbitra-
tion]. 
B. The arbitrator/panel notes the [claim-
ant’s/respondent’s/other parties’] objections to holding 
the hearing via [Platform Name]. The arbitrator/panel 
finds, however, that conducting the hearing via videocon-
ference is a reasonable alternative to an in-person hearing 
in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, stay-at-home orders, 
and travel limitations. Videoconferencing technology will 
provide the parties a fair and reasonable opportunity to 
present their case and will allow the hearing to move for-
ward on the dates previously scheduled instead of post-
poning the hearing to a future date. 
Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
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Thus, the arbitration community has adapted to the modern re-
alities of arbitration––a reality that is very different from 1925 
when the FAA was enacted.233 By applying a textual approach to 
conclude that Section 7 requires only an adjudicative presence and 
permits pre-hearing discovery, courts may remain true to the text 
of the FAA while accommodating procedures that will avoid un-
necessary delay and expense, while simultaneously providing a 
fair, efficient, and expeditious means for the final resolution of the 
parties’ dispute.234 This is not an absurd result. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECTION 7 DURING AND AFTER COVID-
19 
If another circuit is faced with a similar challenge in the post-
COVID era, how will it be presented to the court? Perhaps a case 
will arise where an arbitrator issues a summons pursuant to Section 
17(d) of a state-enacted version of RUAA for a prehearing discov-
 
 233 Other dispute resolution institutions have similar measures in place or 
provide similar support for virtual hearings. See, e.g., ICC Virtual Hearings, 
INT’L CHAMBER =COM., https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/hearing-
centre/icc-virtual-hearings/ (last visited May 15, 2021); Virtual Hearings, INT’L 
CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
services/hearing-facilities/virtual-hearings (last visited May 15, 2021); LCIA 
Arbitration Rules, LONDON CTR. INT’L. ARB. https://www.lcia.org/ 
Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2020.aspx#Article%2014 
(“[A] hearing may take place in person, or virtually by conference call, vide-
oconference or using other communications technology with participants in one 
or more geographical places (or in a combined form).”); HKIAC Guidelines for 
Virtual Hearings, HONG KONG INT’L ARB, CTR., https://www.hkiac.org/
sites/default/files/ck_filebrowser/HKIAC%20Guidelines%20for%20Virtual%20
Hearings_3.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021); Press Release, Seoul Protocol on 
Video Conference in International Arbitration is Released, KCAB INT’L (Mar. 
18, 2020), http://www.kcabinternational.or.kr/user/ 
Board/comm_notice_view.do?BBS_NO=548&BD_NO=169&CURRENT_ME
NU_CODE=MENU0025&TOP_MENU_CODE=MENU0024pdf (last visited 
May 15, 2021); Guidance Note on Remote Dispute Resolution Proceedings, 
CHARTERED INST. ARB., https://www.ciarb.org/media/9013/remote-hearings-
guidance-note_final_140420.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 234 See AA-ICDR Model Order, supra note 230 (referencing the reality that 
Section 7 allows for technology use in arbitration based on the party’s circum-
stances and needs). 
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ery deposition and it is challenged on the ground that such proce-
dure conflicts with the majority holdings of the federal circuits re-
garding use of Section 7 of the FAA for prehearing evidence. 
Would the court hold that FAA Section 7 preempts RUAA Section 
17(d)?235 Is the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Managed Care more 
likely to arise in the context of a challenge to compulsory use of 
video technology to conduct a final arbitral hearing?236 Predicting 
how the issue first presents itself may be unwise, but hopefully, the 
alternative textual analysis performed in this Article will help in-
form the court’s analysis. 
In fairness, prior to March 1, 2020, nobody forced to analyze 
the propriety of using remote technology for various aspects of 
dispute resolution, either as a part of the justice system or alterna-
tive dispute resolution systems, could have anticipated the impact 
COVID-19 would have on the willingness of participants in the 
legal process to convert to video technology for the conduct of 
many, if not all, of its most essential processes.237 Restrictions re-
lated to the COVID-19 pandemic have imposed limitations that 
prevent or severely limit people from appearing “in the physical 
presence of” other people—particularly indoors.238 It is highly un-
likely that Congress in 1925, having survived the 1918 Influenza 
 
 235 Preemption issues relating to the FAA are massively complicated and 
beyond the scope of this Article, but it is certainly conceivable that the issue 
might arise in such a setting. See, e.g., Christopher Drahozal, Federal Arbitra-
tion Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 393 (2004). 
 236 As of the date of submission of this Article, the author is aware of only 
one U.S. case involving a challenge to compulsory conduct of an arbitration 
hearing by video technology. See Legaspy v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., Inc., No. 
20-cv-4700, 2020 WL 4696818, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2020) (denying prelim-
inary injunctive relief sought by a party objecting to the conduct of a FINRA 
arbitration via Zoom). 
 237 See Tamimi, supra note 194 (“However as a result of the necessity 
brought about by the sudden resurgence of the COVID-19, it should come as no 
surprise to the arbitral community that the utilization of technology at all levels 
of the international arbitration system has rocketed in the past few months.”). 
 238 See Protect Yourself & Others, supra note 128 (recommending at least 
six feet of distance between individuals and that persons avoid crowds and poor-
ly ventilated indoor spaces). 
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pandemic,239 used language that was intended to restrict arbitrators 
acting under Section 7 of the FAA from adopting procedures to 
protect the health of citizens summoned to appear and provide evi-
dence relevant to the disputes entrusted to them, even at the risk of 
exposure to the flu or other communicable diseases. However, in 
practice, Managed Care may have such an unintended conse-
quence.240 And if a party to an arbitration, or a non-party witness, 
refuses to be physically present with at least one of the arbitrators, 
a Section 7 summons is likely unenforceable.241 
This is not hypothetical. Arbitral tribunals have faced the issue 
throughout 2020242 and will continue to face it as long as the pan-
demic continues. When arbitrators issue summonses to non-party 
witnesses, at least one of the arbitrators must be prepared to invite 
the witness to appear in-person.243 The arbitrator, therefore, must 
take steps to insure against transmission of COVID-19—to the 
extent possible, and must comply with any government-mandated 
procedures, such as installation of plexiglass shields between the 
witness and the arbitrator.244 If the witness reasonably insists that 
 
 239 1918 Pandemic (H1N1 virus), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-pandemic-
h1n1.html (last updated Mar. 20, 2019). 
 240 See Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 
F.3d 1145, 1158 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he district court for the district in which 
the arbitrators are sitting may compel the attendance of a person refusing to 
obey an arbitral summons.”). Also, in the case the court noted that the inconven-
ience of traveling across state lines was not sufficient to rise to the level of “con-
stitutional concern.” Id. 
 241 Id. at 1161 (“The district court abused its discretion in enforcing the arbi-
tral summons because the court lacked power under Section 7 to order the wit-
ness to appear at the video conference and provide pre-hearing discovery.”). 
 242 See Tamimi, supra note 194 (noting that, because of COVID-19, “in or-
der to ensure the legitimacy of the arbitral process and the subsequent successful 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, it is essential to ascertain the 
basis on which the use of technology in international arbitration . . . may be 
permitted.”). 
 243 See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1161 (holding that summonsed witness 
testimony and documents must be presented in the physical presence of arbitra-
tors). 
 244 See UNIF. ARB. ACT § 15 (“An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in 
such manner as the arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious 
disposition of the proceeding.”). Circumstances of what is fair during COVID-
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the arbitrator be in one office and the witness in a separate confer-
ence room, with the other arbitrators and counsel all attending by 
Zoom connections, would that comply with the requirement that 
the witness be “in the physical presence of” the arbitrator?245 
Hopefully, most parties and witnesses are agreeing to permit such 
examinations by video link so that parties and arbitrators are not 
faced with the decision to postpone hearings or forego relevant 
evidence. 
In practice, Section 7 presents numerous potential scenarios for 
attempting to obtain evidence from non-parties to an arbitration 
governed by the FAA. In light of the circuit split, even in the ab-
sence of the technology issue, these potential scenarios will con-
tinue to challenge counsel and arbitrators. Managed Care compli-
cates the problem for counsel and arbitrators within the Eleventh 
Circuit attempting to use video technology to efficiently process 
arbitration disputes entrusted to them.246 There are many potential 
scenarios in which arbitrators seek evidence from non-parties, and 
the cases sometimes blur them. These scenarios may include: 
1. Summons for documents only seeking pre-hearing produc-
tion outside the presence of the arbitrators or at least one of them. 
This summons would be unenforceable under the textual analysis 
of the majority of circuits to have examined Section 7.247 
 
19 likely involves plexiglass and other preventive measures. See Manufacturing 
Workers and Employers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-
manufacturing-workers-employers.html (suggesting the “[u]se of physical barri-
ers, such as strip curtains, plexiglass or similar materials, or other impermeable 
dividers or partitions to separate” individuals) (last updated Apr. 16, 2021). 
 245 See NYCB White Paper, supra note 186 at 15, 29 (stating “it is not inevi-
table that the physical presence of the arbitrator and the witness in the same 
place is necessary,” and that “[e]lectronic presence of the arbitrator is an ade-
quate substitute for physical presence, because the arbitrator could lawfully 
attend in person.”).  
 246 See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1161 (“Accordingly, we interpret the 
plain meaning of Section 7 as (1) requiring summonsed non-parties to appear in 
the physical presence of the arbitrator as opposed to a video conference or tele-
conference; and (2) prohibiting pre-hearing discovery.”). 
 247 See supra Parts II & III (discussing opinions issued by Fourth, Third, 
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
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2. Summons for documents only seeking pre-hearing produc-
tion in the physical presence of the arbitrators or at least one of 
them. This was close, but not quite the fact pattern addressed by 
Judge Chertoff’s concurring opinion in Hay Group.248 
3. Summons for documents only seeking pre-hearing produc-
tion through electronic means outside presence of the arbitrators or 
at least one of them. As the law now stands, this scenario, too, is 
likely to result in an unenforceable summons in a majority of cir-
cuits.249 
4. Summons for documents only seeking production in the 
presence of the arbitrators at a final hearing. If the summonsed 
non-party is not appearing as a witness, this summons may face 
challenges under existing case law.250 
5. Summons for documents only seeking production by video 
link with the arbitrators on video only. This fact pattern was not 
presented in any reported decision reviewed for this Article. It is 
covered by the NYCB White Paper251 and the Alternative Textual 
Analysis performed in Part IV of this Article.252 It would be per-
mitted under both. 
6. Summons for documents and witness seeking pre-hearing 
production outside presence of the arbitrators or at least one of 
 
 248 See Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 413–14 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (Chertoff, J., concurring). 
 249 See supra Parts II & III (discussing opinions issued by Fourth, Third, 
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
 250 See Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 407 (“[T]he use of the word ‘and’ makes it 
clear that a non-party may be compelled ‘to bring’ items ‘with him’ only when 
the non-party is summoned ‘to attend before [the arbitrator] as a witness.’”); 
Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216 
(2d Cir. 2008) (“The language of section 7 is straightforward and unambiguous. 
Documents are only discoverable in arbitration when brought before arbitrators 
by a testifying witness.”); Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1159–60 (“[T]he FAA 
implicitly withholds the power to compel documents from non-parties without 
summoning the non-party to testify. And if Congress intended the arbitrators to 
have the broader power to compel documents from non-parties without sum-
moning the non-party to testify, it could have said so.”). 
 251 Supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 252 Supra Part IV. 
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them. This summons is susceptible to challenges under cases re-
viewed in this Article.253 
7. Summons for documents and witness seeking pre-hearing 
production in physical presence of the arbitrators or at least one of 
them. This is the recommended procedure set forth in Judge 
Chertoff’s concurrence in Hay Group.254 
8. Summons for documents and witness seeking pre-hearing 
video link with the arbitrators or at least one of them on the video. 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Managed Care, is the only circuit that has 
specifically addressed the use of video technology. The Eleventh 
Circuit prohibits non-party witnesses from appearing via video 
conference and, instead, requires the physical presence of arbitra-
tors.255 The Alternative Textual Analysis performed in Part IV of 
this Article would permit this scenario.256 
9. Summons for documents and witness seeking production in 
presence of the arbitrators at the hearing. This is the only enforcea-
ble summons under Section 7 as interpreted by the Managed Care 
court.257 At present, unless parties and non-party witnesses waive 
their objections, this is the only available avenue for obtaining 
non-party evidence in arbitrations conducted in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. 
10. Summons for documents and witness seeking production at 
hearing by video link with the arbitrators and all parties on video.  
As arbitrations continue during the pandemic and produce 
awards that are subject to enforcement and vacatur proceedings, it 
seems likely that some of them will include compulsory summons-
es to third parties and may present opportunities for courts to re-
view the use of video technology under Section 7 as well as chal-
lenges to use of such technology more generally. The Alternative 
Textual Analysis performed in Part IV of this Article would permit 
enforcement of such a summons. 
 
 253 See supra Parts II & III (discussing opinions issued by Fourth, Third, 
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
 254 See id. at 413–14 (Chertoff, J., concurring). 
 255 See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1159–61. 
 256 Supra Part IV. 
 257 See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1161. 
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No single case can present a court with all or even a significant 
number of the scenarios outlined above. Hopefully, future courts 
will consider the multiple ways Section 7 is utilized as they face 
whatever fact pattern is presented to them. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues presented by the circuit split and the Managed Care 
decision will likely present themselves to other circuits and even-
tually to the Supreme Court in the not-too-distant future.258 When 
they do, the courts should take a broad look at how Section 7 is 
utilized by counsel and arbitrators. This Article has suggested an 
alternative textual analysis utilizing multiple dictionaries from the 
1920s that a court might consider.259 Whatever approach the courts 
take in resolving the circuit split, this Article strongly suggests that 
Section 7 not be interpreted in a fashion that prohibits compulsory 
use of video technology to obtain evidence in arbitrations governed 
by the FAA.260 
 
 
 258 See discussion supra Parts II & III. 
 259 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 260 See discussion supra Part V. 
